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 This paper will investigate the impacts of process and outcome accountability on 
the behavior of organizational stakeholders in order to reconcile conflicting findings 
regarding the efficacy of each. I propose a modifying dimension of the position of a 
given stakeholder to the organization. My first hypothesis is that process accountability 
structures compared to outcome accountability structures will enhance training mastery 
for internal stakeholders; my second hypothesis is that process accountability will 
decrease the attraction of the occupation for external stakeholders compared to 
outcome accountability. My method of investigation is an archival documentation of 
literature around international competitive figure skating following the transition from 
an outcome accountability judging system (6.0 system) to a process accountability 
system (International Judging System). My work contributes to prior research by 
providing a mediating framework through which to understand previous findings. 
Ultimately, my findings may serve organizational leaders seeking practical guidelines 

















In a world governed by organizations, individuals are connected through accountability 
structures. These structures serve as the skeletons compartmentalizing and defining operations of 
the organizations they support. A well-crafted accountability system can be powerful in uniting 
people toward a common purpose. Conversely, a system out of touch with an organization’s 
expressed values will derail the organization from achieving its goals. Thus, it is essential for 
organizational leaders to fully understand the range of possibilities for the accountability 
structure they design to ensure that it is in keeping with the guiding principles of their 
overarching organization.  
In this paper, I will investigate the impacts of the two broad types of accountability 
structures, process accountability (otherwise known as “behavioral control”) and outcome 
accountability (otherwise known as “market control”) on the behaviors of an organization’s 
stakeholders. Whereas the first, process accountability requires decision-makers to justify the 
process steps toward coming to a decision, the latter, outcome accountability, requires decision 
makers to justify only the outcome of their decisions. The field of research available provides 
conflicting evidence on the benefits and detriments of each type of accountability structure.  
The purpose of my research is to reconcile the conflicting findings with regards to the 
outcomes of these different accountability structures. I argue that one way to reconcile these 
findings is to specify whether the outcome of interest is internal to the organization (e.g. 
employee learning) or external (e.g. occupational attraction to stakeholders). My first hypothesis 
is that process accountability structures will enhance internal outcomes, specifically employees’ 
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learning mastery, compared to outcome accountability structures. Conversely, my second 
hypothesis is that process accountability structures will also impede external outcomes, 
specifically by decreasing external stakeholder interest in the profession, compared to outcome 
accountability structures. 
In order to test these hypotheses, I will be conducting a case study in international 
competitive figure skating. Figure skating provides a rich context of both feats of athletic ability 
balanced against artistic expression – both of which much be captured through an evaluative 
structure. In this context, the International Judging System (IJS) replaced the 6.0 judging system 
in 2004 as the evaluation system at all international competitions. Whereas the 6.0 judging 
system is an outcome accountability structure, requiring a holistic judgement of the cumulative 
effect of a skater’s performance, the IJS is a process accountability structure that provides many 
guidelines holding skaters accountable to the quality of individual elements they execute within a 
program. This dichotomy will allow me to compare the era prior and post the implementation of 
a process accountability system in international figure skating.  
Both my hypotheses will be investigated through archival documentation. More 
specifically, hypothesis 1 (with regards to learning mastery) will be explored through skating 
insiders’ statements on training and the change in training-related rules implemented by the US 
Figure Skating Association (the US national governing body of figure skating) under the IJS 
versus the 6.0 system. Hypothesis 2 (with regards to external image and attraction) will be tested 
by examining interest in the sport over time from the perspective of both skating insiders 
(published statements) and external stakeholders: spectators (sport popularity polls), the media 
(New York Times article archives), as well as prospective competitors (USFS membership 
numbers). 
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Overall, my research makes the following theoretical contributions: First it provides a 
framework to reconcile conflicting effects of accountability structures uncovered through 
existing research -- that the directionality of impact on stakeholders depends on whether the 
stakeholder is internal or external to the organization. Second, it provides a longitudinal view of 
the effects of process and outcome accountability structures, which virtually no previous 
experimental research has covered (Chang et al. 2017). Third, my research provides a practical 
framework that managers may use to choose the proper accountability structure to serve their 
organizational goals.  
Accountability Structures 
 Accountability structures are designed to tie an organization together. They help answer 
the question of “who answers to whom for what”, thus aligning people’s incentives to match 
organizational goals (Tetlock 1985). Understanding these accountability structures is important 
because they serve as the underlying backbone to the social and organizational contexts in which 
people make decisions (Tetlock 1985). Designing an accountability system to augment the 
performance of its people is a prerequisite to operating an organization successfully.  
 Designing an accountability system can be a complex endeavor because holding people 
accountable tends to influence their cognitive processing, impacting “how we think beyond 
simply what we think” (Frink et al. 2008). This is because accountability structures direct people 
where to focus their attention, which can affect how they process information (Simonson & Nye 
1992). This idea that people change their behavior to conform to evaluation systems is known as 
“reactivity” (Espeland & Sauder 2007). Members’ reactivity can be beneficial to an organization 
if the accountability system aligns well with the organization’s purpose and values. However, 
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these systems must be carefully designed and constructed because people’s behaviors may 
conform to the accountability system in ways counterproductive to organizational goals.  
There are many ways to categorize accountability structures; this paper will focus on two 
main categories: process and outcome accountability.  
Under process accountability, decision makers are held accountable for the procedures 
they conduct, often having to justify their choices in the process of making decisions. The 
evaluative cultures associated with process accountability tend to be more standardized as 
decision makers use specific evaluation rules to guide their actions (Liberman et al. 1999). 
Standardized behavior is especially important in environments that require high degrees of 
worker precision. An example would be an emergency medical services provider being held 
accountable for following every step of a checklist on standard operating procedures, rather than 
for simply the patient’s eventual health outcome.  
Organizations typically choose to use a process accountability system in order to codify 
their decision-making practices (Sutcliffe & McNamara 2001). By formalizing the decision-
making process, organizations can exploit knowledge routines to ensure that best practices are 
reliably followed (Hackman & Wageman 1995). In essence, process accountability systems 
allow managers to explicitly convey what employees should do to achieve results (Anderson & 
Oliver 1987). In the case of the emergency medical services provider, a process accountability 
system is a practical choice because it is important for service providers to standardize 
procedures as much as possible to ensure that best practices are being followed in the care for 
each patient.  
The corresponding drawback to process accountability is that all newcomers to the 
organization are indoctrinated into the standard procedure, which is taken for granted as “the 
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way things are done” (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Employees become unlikely to innovate at 
the expense of deviating from the codified best practice. The result could be excessive 
conformity to practices that become less and less relevant as the needs of the organization 
change. Further, the more ingrained these practices are to the organizational culture, the more 
resistant incumbents may be to change, making the organization all the less adaptable. This result 
could be problematic for modern corporations as Keller and Price have identified that 
“innovation and change have replaced scale and stability as the key drivers of firm success” 
(2011).  
Under outcome accountability, decision makers are evaluated on the results of their 
actions, without attention paid to how they achieved those results. Within these structures, 
decision makers are given much more flexibility on the approaches they choose to achieve their 
desired outcomes. This can be appealing to employees who enjoy the intellectual challenge of 
choosing their own work processes. An example of outcome accountability would be a trader 
held accountable only to their returns on investments, rather than the rationale behind their 
decisions to buy or sell specific assets. The trader would be left to his own devices to determine 
his investment strategies.             
Organizations may choose to use outcome accountability systems if there are many 
factors that could lead to a good outcome, and as a result, it becomes difficult to parse out a 
standard set of best practices (Anderson & Oliver 1987). Outcome accountability systems 
provide employees with the flexibility to use many different potential processes to accomplish 
the same goal (Patil & Tetlock 2014). As a result, employees have the opportunity to employ 
greater creativity in accomplishing their goals, simultaneously driving the discovery of more 
innovative solutions.  
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The corresponding drawback to outcome accountability is that employees choose 
whichever procedure they deem best in achieving optimal outcomes, which makes it difficult to 
identify best practices to codify them elsewhere in the organization (Patil, Vieder, Tetlock 2014). 
Furthermore, deviating excessively from established best practices can be problematic to an 
organization when the established routines do a reasonable job of capturing the key features of 
the performance task (Arkes, Dawes, & Christensen 1986). The danger is that in failing to 
strictly codify best practices into the evaluation system, organization run the risk of encouraging 
inappropriate deviation from these best practices.  
Literature Review 
The field of research available provides conflicting evidence on the benefits and 
detriments of each type of accountability structure.  
Many experiments conducted within a laboratory setting yielded overwhelmingly 
positive results for process accountability tests compared to those of outcome accountability 
tests. Process accountability is often found to yield more analytic decision-making with less 
reliance on heuristic approaches (McAllister, Mitchell, & Beach 1979; Chaiken 1980; Rozelle & 
Baxter 1981). Further, decision makers evaluate more information and expend greater effort in 
the decision-making process (Ford & Weldon 1981; Ashton 1992; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates 1996; 
Chang et al.1997; Asare et al. 2000; Brtek & Motowidlo 2002; Slaughter et al. 2006; Dalla Via, 
Perego, van Rinsum 2019). These factors contribute to a greater consistency in decision-maker 
performance (Hagafors & Brehmer 1983; Johnson & Kaplan 1991; Ashton 1992; DeZoort et al. 
2006).  
Other studies have found that process accountability systems are only effective in certain 
contexts. For example, prior research indicates that process accountability has had a more 
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pronounced effect improving the performance of novice decision-makers compared to an 
insignificant effect on those experienced in the field (Kennedy 1993, Kim & Trotman 2015). 
This result is fairly intuitive given that process accountability is used as a tool to standardize best 
practices (Sutcliffe & McNamara 2001). Novice decision-makers without substantial experience 
with best practices would benefit from process accountability rules as a means of knowledge 
acquisition.  
Research over outcome accountability had uncovered that it improves performance in 
high complexity tasks. Characteristics of high complexity tasks include configural evaluation 
(evaluating patterns of interactions between elements as opposed to evaluating all factors 
additively) (de Langhe et al. 2011) and uncertain outcomes unlikely to be identified through 
more information processing (Liu 2015, Harris et al. 2009). In configural evaluation, when 
interaction effects make it difficult to parse out a standard evaluation procedure, outcome 
accountability provides employees the flexibility necessary to accomplish their tasks (Anderson 
& Oliver 1987, Patil & Tetlock 2014). Outcome accountability has also been found to improve 
the creativity of generated ideas (Hausser et al. 2017). In tackling uncertain situations, outcome 
accountability affords managers greater flexibility to adjust goals to reflect changing 






Article PA/OA Findings Experimental Structure 
McAllister, Mitchell, and Beach 
(1979)  PA 
More analytic (less reliance on heuristic) strategies in 
decision-making 
Defended decisions on market potential for sporting 
goods 
Chaiken (1980)  PA 
Employed systematic processing strategies; Less 
swayed by non-analytic factors 
Anticipate discussion on interview decision-making 
process 
Ford and Weldon (1981) PA 
Likelier to store and more thoroughly review all relevant 
info 
Evaluated candidates for position and asked for 
reasoning behind decisions 
Rozelle and Baxter (1981)  PA 
More reliable evaluations (less subject to personal 
idiosyncrasies) Believed committee evaluated interview rationales 
Hagafors and Brehmer (1983)  PA 
Greater consistency and analytic processing in low task 
predictability situations Justified reasons for predictions 
Johnson and Kaplan (1991) PA Increased consistency of results (auditor consensus) 
Auditor justified decisions in inventory obsolescence 
exercises 
Ashton (1992)  PA 
Greater use of available evidence; Greater accuracy and 
consistency Auditors justified industrial bond predictions 
Simonson and Nye (1992)  PA No evidence for greater consistency across participants Justified choices in sunk cost problem 
Henderson and Lee (1992) PA/OA 
PA positively affects project outcomes; OA insignificant 
results  
Kennedy (1993) PA 
Improved novice bankruptcy predictions, no effect on 
auditors' judgements Justified reasons for predictions 
Bonner and Walker (1994) OA 
Outcome feedback insufficient for knowledge 
acquisition; require process rules in addition 
Auditors provided with combos of instructions and 
feedback 
Siegel-Jacobs and Yates (1996)  PA/OA 
PA increased complexity of thinking: took more info 
into account, beneficial if info is relevant. Greater 
variability in OA performance 
Interviewed on how judgements made vs. Prize for 
accurate judgements 
Aulakh et al. (1996) OA Negative to insignificant impact on performance  
Chang et al. (1997) PA Increased effort but not performance 
Students given problem solving tasks and asked to 
justify choices 
Tan and Kao (1999) OA 
No effect on performance on low-complexity tasks, 
improved high complexity task performance Auditors told work would be reviewed for accuracy;  
Asare et al. (2000) PA 
More effort expended in testing (increased breadth of 
tests, more errors tested) Auditors justified gross margin testing 
Brtek and Motowidlo (2002) PA/OA 
PA increased accuracy via attentiveness to information; 
OA lowered interview impression validity 
Justified process of evaluating employee interviews 
vs. held accountable to supervisor ratings 
Table 1. Experimental studies on process and outcome accountability 
 
 11 
Bonner et al. (2002) PA/OA 
PA mixed results; OA negative/insignificant effects on 
outcome  
Kennedy (1993) PA 
Improved novice performance but not professional 
auditors' 
Audit managers and MBA students justified 
bankruptcy predictions 
Klein et al. (2006) PA/OA 
PA positively affects project outcomes; OA insignificant 
results  
DeZoort et al. (2006) PA Improves effort and consistency  
Slaughter et al. (2006)  PA/OA 
Decoy effect stronger under PA because more 
information taken into account 
Wrote short essay explaining decision strategies vs. 
decisions compared against “real” decisions of 
organization 
Harris et al. (2009) OA 
Effective in uncertain environments: allow for balance 
of control and emergence  
 Tiwana and Keil (2010) PA/OA 
PA insignificant impact on performance; OA positive 
impact on performance  
Gopal and Gosain (2010) PA/OA 
PA insignificant impact on performance; OA slight 
positive impact on performance 
Controls varied across Indian software projects; 
Outcomes evaluated on product quality and project 
efficiency 
de Langhe et al. (2011)  PA/OA 
Process accountability superior when cues have 
elemental effects on outcome (when one-time eval of 
multiple factors), but outcome accountability superior 
when cues have configural effects on outcome (when 
must draw patterns from long-term memory) 
Evaluated predictions based on judgement strategy 
vs. accuracy  
Chua et al. (2012) PA/OA 
OA more effective when desired behavior is unclear in 
complex cases  
Kreutzer et al. (2015) PA/OA 
OA provides flexibility and motivation due to discretion 
to choose path to achieving goals  
Liu (2015) PA/OA OA more effective in highly complex cases 
Compare outcomes of IT project with behavioral vs. 
outcome control systems 
Kim & Trotman (2015) PA/OA 
Novice performance greater gains than experienced 
under PA, greater professional skepticism under PA 
Manipulated PA vs. OA & novice vs. experienced; 
Professional skepticism measured in auditing 
exercise 
Hausser, Frisch, Wanzel, Schulz-
Hardt (2017) PA/OA 
PA longer processing time, less creative ideas; OA less 
ideas, less unique ideas 
Idea generation activity to students primed to process 
or outcome focus 
Dalla Via, Perego, van Rinsum 
(2019) PA/OA 
PA stimulates greater search efforts and enhances 
process efficiency 
Students make decisions as retail managers; 




In order to make sense of the plethora of literature associating various measures of 
organizational effectiveness to each accountability system, researchers have established 
conceptual frameworks contextualizing these measures along other dimensions that may mediate 
accountability effects. One such foundational model was established by Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 
who surveyed a large group of experts to systematically classify indices of organizational 
effectiveness selected from a review of relevant literature (1983).  
 
 
The resulting model (Figure 1) contextualizes organizational effectiveness indices on a 
two by two matrix. One dimension is the type of accountability on a spectrum from formal 
Figure 1 Quinn & Rohrbaugh's organizational effectiveness model. 
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(process accountability) to flexible (outcome accountability). The other dimension is an internal, 
individual focus versus an external, organizational-oriented focus. The resulting spatial model 
provides a framework through which to classify the strengths of the four types of organizations 
identified. For example, a flexible organization with an external focus would be highly adaptable 
and more favorable to evaluations by external entities, whereas a less flexible organization with 
an internal focus would be stable and have strong channels for information management. This 
type of model provides clarifying contexts through which to understand the many impacts of 
organizational control structures. 
To motivate accountability structure research, work has also been done to understand 
how accountability structures have been implemented in real-world organizations. Theodore 
Porter has identified a broad trend across many fields reflecting a desire for quantitative authority 
involving explicit, standardized rules in order to eliminate discretion, bias, and subjectivity 
(1995). This is because the collective understanding of institutional legitimacy has become 
increasingly linked to strict accountability (Power 2003). However, as briefly touched upon 
above, different accountability structures can have a range of impacts on the behaviors of the 
people they govern. In many cases, an outcome accountability system may be more aligned with 
institutional values and purposes than a strict, process accountability system. Thus, it is 
important to thoroughly understand the consequences of different kinds of accountability. In 
other words, more research needs to be done into the mediating contexts in which process 
accountability systems perform better than outcome accountability and vice versa. 
Theoretical Development 
 The goal of this paper is to reconcile the conflicting findings with regards to the impacts 
of different accountability structures and to determine the most suitable contexts for each. I build 
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upon Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s spatial model of organizational effectiveness to argue that an 
effectual way to reconcile these findings is to specify whether the outcome of interest is internal 
to the organization (e.g., employee learning) or external (e.g., occupational attraction to 
stakeholders). 
I hypothesize that process accountability enhances learning mastery within an 
organization. Learning mastery (also referred to as training mastery) is a concept capturing an 
employee’s growth in “learning the ropes” or progressing toward mastering the skills required to 
perform successfully in a role. As established through prior research, process accountability 
structures are associated with consistency through the codification of standard best practices 
(Hackman & Wageman 1995). Eliminating uncertainty over what should be done allows 
employees to focus on accomplishing their goals (Reyt & Wiesenfeld 2015). This state of 
certainty, known as a lower construal state, enhances employee learning toward mastery of a 
specific task (Wiesenfeld & Gollwitzer 1999). This feature of process accountability structures 
likely contributes to experimental findings that process accountability improves the performance 
of novices in training more so than for more experienced employees (Kennedy 1993, Kim & 
Trotman 2015). Further, practice with solely outcome feedback has not been found to assist in 
employees’ knowledge acquisition unless it is preceded by detailed instructions (Bonner & 
Walker 1994). Thus, I suggest: 
Hypothesis 1: Process accountability structures will enhance internal outcomes, specifically 
employees’ learning mastery, compared to outcome accountability structures. 
 Conversely, I hypothesize that process accountability lowers occupational attraction to 
stakeholders. Occupational attraction encompasses an organization’s ability to garner the interest 
of outsiders and engage them in its operations. Occupational attraction is essential to any 
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organization because organizations depend on their ability to attract new talent to continue to 
operate and grow (Finnegan 2010). A key factor to occupational attraction is the level of 
empowerment employees feel in making crucial decisions in their own work (Batra 2017). 
Process accountability tends to be mechanistic, emphasizing predictable performance (Ouchi 
1980, Das & Teng 1998). Definitionally, it provides a scripted approach from which employees 
do not have much room to deviate. Conversely, outcome accountability defines end goals while 
allowing employees a high level of abstraction as to how to achieve them (Liberman et al. 2001). 
This cognitive abstraction allows decision-makers the space to generate many hypothetical 
alternatives, enabling exploration (Gavetti et al. 2005, Trope & Liberman 2013). This is likely 
why outcome accountability systems have been found to improve the creativity of decision 
makers’ ideas (Hausser et al. 2017). In addition, the higher degree of discretion employees have 
in choosing their own path under outcome accountability has been associated with a greater 
degree of employee motivation (Kreutzer et al. 2015). Thus, I suggest:  
Hypothesis 2: Process accountability structures will impede external outcomes, specifically by 
decreasing external stakeholder interest in the profession, compared to outcome accountability 
structures. 
Introduction to the Case Study: Figure Skating Judging Systems 
In order to test these hypotheses, I will be using international amateur figure skating as a 
case study through which to evaluate stakeholders’ behavioral responses to different 
accountability structures. International sport is an environment that has long since recognized the 
importance of constructing judging structures to reflect “rationally-grounded principles about the 
nature and purpose of the sport” (Dixon 2003). This is because success in sports is much more 
explicitly tied to the rules of the game than in other organizational contexts (e.g. start-ups that 
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strive for success in a cloud of market uncertainties). The willingness of participants to engage 
with a sport depends on the understanding that officials adjudicate athlete performances in a way 
fair and accurate to the mutually agreed upon standards of the sport (Russell 1997). At the height 
of international competition, athletes have each displayed a deep understanding of and 
substantial effort toward operating within the constraints of their respective judging structures to 
achieve world-class levels of performance. Participants here are more directly influenced by 
judging structures compared to those in other contexts who may be motivated to perform by a 
range of diverse factors. Thus, competitive international sports provide natural contexts through 
which to study how accountability structures directly shape stakeholders’ performance and 
behavior.  
International figure skating was chosen as the specific sports context because the sport 
has undergone a shift in recent history from an outcome accountability to a process 
accountability judging system. Thus, it provides a convenient comparison through which to 
evaluate how stakeholders’ behaviors have changed in response. Furthermore, figure skating is a 
particularly rich context because the sport involves evaluating both strictly codified technical 
feats as well as more qualitative, creative components (Findlay 2004). Thus, the figure skating 
judging system reflects a complex range of evaluative tasks that parallel those that evaluators 
may face in other evaluative contexts.  
Historical Context of the Sport 
 Figure skating has evolved substantially from its earliest days. Skating had been used as a 
form of transportation by people for thousands of years. However, the beginning of the sport in 
its competitive form took place in Europe in the mid-19th century (Hanley 2000). This is when 
steel-bladed skates were introduced, which were strong enough for skaters to perform intricate 
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twists and turns on ice, also known as figures. These figures were the foundational technical 
elements of figure skating; many manuals were written at the time describing hundreds of 
possible patterns and the standards for excellence of each one (Hines 2015). The earliest 
competitions in the 1880s featured a combination of these skating patterns with ballet moves. 
Though figure skating has evolved dramatically from these early days, its heart of objectively 
evaluated technical feats combined with subjective artistic expression still a core feature of the 
sport.  
 Skating first formalized with the founding of the London Skating Club in 1830 and the 
New Brunswick skating club in 1833 (Hines 2006). These clubs in Europe and North America 
became hotbeds that drove major technical advancements. It was in these subsequent years that 
many new figures were invented and documented (Hines 2015). Figure skating came under an 
international organization called the International Skating Union (ISU) in 1892 (Hanley 2000). 
Soon thereafter, figure skating became an 
Olympic sport in 1896. In their earliest 
iterations, international skating competitions 
were made of two events: compulsory figures 
that showcased a skater’s mastery of standard 
technical elements and free skating that was a 
more flexible showcase of a skater’s 
creativity and artistry (Hines 2015).  
 Throughout the 20th century, skating elements became increasingly formalized. Jumps 
and spins that had previously been captured as elements within figures, became competitive 
components themselves (Hines 2006). The split of jump and spin elements from figures allowed 
Figure 2 Compulsory figure, Britannica 
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for Pair Skating and Ice Dancing to become separate competitive divisions in the late 20th 
century. Ice Dancing remained grounded in traditional figures and drew stylistic inspiration from 
popular ballroom dances of the time, such as waltz and polka. Pair Skating drew more heavily 
from bigger ticket jump and spin elements, which evolved into the dazzling twists and throws of 
today.  
 One of the biggest changes to the sport was the elimination of the compulsory figures 
event for singles and pairs skaters in 1991 (Harvey 1992). Previously, these figures had been the 
measure of a skater’s technical prowess and made up 60 percent of a skater’s final score. 
However, the sport eliminated figures after television ratings became indispensable to the 
financial health of the sport (Radnofsky 2019). Compulsory figure events, though considered 
important by veterans of the sport, consisted of up to eight hours of skaters drawing identical 
patterns across the ice. The consensus was they made for bad TV and thus, were not broadcasted. 
However, TV audiences would tune in only for the free skating portions of the competition and 
were often confused and unhappy when the best free skaters did not necessarily win overall. The 
ISU cut the compulsory figures event to augment the popular appeal of the sport (Harvey 1992). 
Instead, skating competitions were judged purely on the merits of a short program and free skate, 
each with a set of jump, spin, and step sequence requirements.  
 The elimination of compulsory figures shifted the technical focus of the sport to jumping 
passes (Radnofsky 2019). Though figures were difficult to execute, they did not require the same 
degree of raw athleticism as jumps, the most difficult of which require skaters to launch 
themselves 1.5 feet off the ground and spin in the air faster than the blades of a high-grade 
blender. The structural shift of figure skating away from compulsory figures accelerated the 
technical advancement of the sport. The following three decades became known as the “Quad 
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Revolution” as skaters competed to embed increasingly difficult jumping passes into their 
programs, the most challenging of which is a quadruple jump, requiring a skater to perform four 
revolutions in the air (Tabb 2018). In the present day, feats of athleticism have become a staying 
attraction of the sport as skaters continue to push the bounds of what is humanly possible. 
 Though the sport has evolved dramatically, figure skating has retained the spirit from its 
earliest days of competition. From the beginning, skating has always been a display of technical 
prowess in concert with performative aplomb. Capturing this balance in an evaluative structure 
has never been an easy task. In recent history, the ISU has had the challenge of reevaluating how 
to capture this balance within the confines of a new, more objective judging system.    
Evolution of the Judging System 
 The figure skating judging system came under scrutiny after the 2002 Winter Olympic 
games (Roberts 2002). Jamie Sale and David Pelletier of Canada skated a flawless program that 
brought the stadium roaring to its feet. Sandra Bezic, NBC commentator of the event and five-
time Canadian pairs champion, likewise assured of their victory announced, “Simply perfect… 
They did it (Associated Press 2002)!”  But when the scores came up, the Russian team, Yelena 
Berezhnaya and Anton Sikharulidze, who committed a few mistakes in their program were 
awarded the gold medal instead. Within 24 hours, one judge, Marie Le Gougne of France, 
admitted to being pressured prior to the event to rank the Russian team over the Canadians. The 
revelation took the skating world by storm. The Olympic committee awarded Sale and Pelletier 
an Olympic gold and issued the ISU an ultimatum to rework its judging system or risk being 
struck from the Winter Olympics in the following cycle (Roberts 2002).  
 The previous judging system, known as the 6.0 system, was designed to enable judges to 
evaluate the overall effect of the skater’s performance – an outcome accountability system. The 
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6.0 system is named as such for the designation of 6.0 as the perfect score. The skater receives a 
mark out of 6.0 for both technical merit, the quality of execution of each of the elements (jumps, 
spins, and steps), and artistic merit, the skater’s quality of musical interpretation, performance, 
and originality. The theory behind the system is that judges would assign skaters points based on 
how close they come to presenting an ideal, holistic program. Judges’ technical and artistic 
scores are combined to come out with an “ordinal”, or the skater’s rank compared to all other 
competitors. Each skater’s ordinals from all the judges would be aggregated to determine the 
final placements.  
Under the 6.0 system, judges have a great deal of discretion in determining the skater’s 
point totals and placement based on their impression of the skater’s holistic performance. 
Unfortunately, it was this level of discretion that the Olympic committee felt allowed inordinate 
flexibility for illegitimate judging behavior. Thus, the ISU moved towards a judging system that 
more strictly codified a set of standardized rules. This shift from outcome to process 
accountability is a textbook example of the broader trend identified by Porter where a desire to 
eliminate bias, and thus, discretion, motivates decision makers to move towards explicitly 
defined rules (1995). 
The new system, known as the International Judging System (IJS), was implemented by 
the ISU in 2004 and provides much stricter guidelines on how each element a skater performs 
should be judged. Each skating component (e.g. jumps, spins, choreography, performance) is 
awarded a set number of points based on the quality with which the skater executes it. The ISU 
skating rulebook provides clear criteria on the number of points each element should be 
rewarded. Rather than giving the judges the ability to reflect the holistic effect of a skater’s 
performance in his or her overall scores, the IJS serves as a checklist of parts the judge verifies in 
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order to determine the skater’s additive score. In that sense, the ISU’s shift to the IJS was a shift 
to a process accountability system. 
Like the 6.0 system, the IJS is made up of a technical and an artistic score. The technical 
score evaluates the jumps, spins, and step sequences skaters perform in each of their programs. 
Each element a skater performs is assigned a base level of points based off the level of difficulty 
it takes to execute; for example, a quadruple revolution jump has a higher base value than a triple 
jump. From the base value, judges have the ability to assign skaters a Grade of Execution (GOE) 
of -5 to +5 points based on how well the skater executed the element. The ISU rulebook provides 
specific criteria for what a jump of each GOE level entails. For a +5 GOE designation, a jump 
must be “superior in all jump phases (e.g. unexpected or difficult entry phase, great 
height/distance, strong flow in and out and superior extension on landing)” (International Skating 
Union 2018). Negative GOE points are taken for mistakes such as under-rotations and unstable 
landings. 
The artistic score (known officially as the program component score) is made up of five 
components: skating skills, transitions, choreography, interpretation, and performance. Each of 
these measures of artistic performance has its own set of criteria defined by the ISU rulebook. In 
essence, they capture how effortless, intricate, original, expressive, and projected a skater’s 
performance is. These scores are given on a scale from 1 to 10 in increments of 0.25 with 
guidelines for what each of these scores should entail. A score of around an 8.0 is considered a 
world class performance. 
Research Structure 
In order to investigate how outcome and process accountability systems each influence 
the broader organizations they are instituted to govern, I will be examining the dialogue of 
 22 
insiders and observers of figure skating to determine the how the 6.0 system and the IJS 
respectively impacted stakeholders of the sport. The 6.0 judging system is an outcome 
accountability structure that evaluates a skater’s performance based on a holistic judgement of 
the cumulative effect of a skater’s performance. By contrast, the IJS system is a process 
accountability structure that provides rigid guidelines holding skaters accountable to the quality 
of individual elements they execute.  
In the context of amateur international figure skating, the hypotheses should be 
understood as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: The IJS as compared to the 6.0 system codifies the standard for what is considered 
to be a quality program, so internal stakeholders should respond with a greater degree of 
training mastery as well as formalization of training structures.  
A higher degree of training mastery is to be expected as it has been long since established 
in sports psychology that the key to expert level performance is “deliberate practice”. Ericsson et 
al. conducted a review of a century of laboratory studies into learning and skills acquisition and 
concluded that effective training depends on repetitive deliberate practice informed by regular 
feedback. They concluded that such activities are “high on effort, and comparatively low on 
inherent enjoyment” (1993).  The key to motivating such effective, deliberate training is “the full 
consciousness of the immediate object to aim at” (Martin 1953). In other words, in order to 
motivate deliberate practice, skaters must have a clear understanding of their immediate training 
goals. The strict guidelines for quality defined by the IJS should provide skaters with a clear 
understanding of how their performances should be improved, which should in turn, focus their 
training efforts toward achieving the IJS-defined standard of success. 
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In addition, the formalization of training should be reflected in the structural 
organizations built around skater training. Formalization of standards tend to beget greater 
formalization because formal rules require categories to be defined and taught to all participants 
involved (Lom 2013). The IJS was conceived with new concepts around technical mastery (e.g. 
the guidelines that categorize a spin as level 4 difficulty versus level 3). These concepts must be 
communicated to officials and coaches, and through them, to skaters. Thus, following the 
implementation of the IJS, I would expect to find more rigorously defined certifications and 
training programs for members under official skating organizations like national skating 
federations.  
Hypothesis 2: The IJS as compared to the 6.0 system encourages standardized performances, 
disincentivizing originality and thereby diminishing the sport’s popularity with the viewing 
public.  
As athletes are able to derive tangible guidance from the IJS through its rigidly defined 
standards for success, they understandably rally to construct programs that maximize their 
potential point outcomes under it. After the implementation of the IJS, professors of Kinesiology, 
Rosengerg and Lockwood, identified its weakness as its “premium on the notion that victory is 
merely the sum of parts” (2005). As such, they expected skaters to construct their programs to 
conform to the highest standard of difficulty defined by the IJS rather than developing the “full 
richness and wholeness of performances”. Considering much of the appeal of figure skating for 
spectators lies in its performance showcases “beyond pure physical accomplishment”, it would 
be expected that homogenized performances would be a blow to the sport’s popular appeal with 
both viewing audiences and prospective new entrants (Katz 2014).  
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My work will build upon a body of work (e.g. a doctorate thesis in the field of sociology 
by Stacy E. Lom of Northwestern University), examining international amateur figure skating as 
a case study to investigate evaluative cultures. Lom specifically interviewed 33 skating insiders 
in 2006 to determine how the shift in judging systems over the 2004 season impacted the 
behavior of officials, coaches, and skaters (2013). From these interviews, Lom found that the IJS 
aided skaters in deriving more targeted feedback from officials and competitive results and 
encouraged them to pursue more comprehensive training methods. However, the rigid structure 
of the IJS also encouraged skaters to conform to the system, which resulted in “cookie cutter” 
programs that emphasized technical merit and devalued artistry.  
My thesis will build on upon past findings by first, expanding from a sociological focus 
on the effects on individuals within figure skating to a broader organizational research 
perspective. In addition to understanding the micro-level behavioral changes of the skaters and 
other individuals involved with the sport, I will evaluate the macro-level effects on both 
organizational formalization and the sport’s popularity with external stakeholders. This more 
expansive view will provide metrics that will ascertain the impact of accountability systems on 
the performance of the occupation of figure skating as a whole. 
Second, my research will provide insight into how the judging system change has 
influenced the sport over time. Interviews from previous research provide a snapshot into how 
skating insiders were responding to the shift from outcome to process accountability shortly after 
its implementation. I will be synthesizing results from the past couple of decades to understand 
how the sport has continued to adapt in response to the IJS. In doing so, I will be able to 
determine whether the initial responses of skaters, coaches, and officials continue to hold true to 
 25 
the present day and how their impressions have changed since they have come to accept the IJS 
as their status quo. 
Methodology 
 In order to investigate hypothesis one (in regard to training mastery), I will examine 
effects on training from both a micro and a macro perspective. On the micro-scale, I will draw 
from first-hand published statements from skaters, coaches, and officials to determine the impact 
of the judging system change at the individual level. These statements will provide an immediate 
perspective into how the shift from the 6.0 system to the IJS caused skating insiders to 
consciously change the ways they approach training. I will be comparing the responses of skaters 
to the judging system change during the subsequent Olympic cycle (2004-2006) to the 
statements made in the years at least two cycles after (2010-present), presumably after skating 
insiders have adjusted to operating under the IJS. This comparison will allow me to determine 
whether the perceived impact was consistent over time.  
On the macro-scale, I will be using data from the US Figure Skating Association’s annual 
Report of Action to determine if official skating institutions reflected the expected formalization 
of training procedures following the shift to the IJS. USFS is the United States’ governing body 
for competitive figure skating. Each country represented in the ISU has its own such official 
governing body to oversee the development of athletes and clubs (Figure 3). These organizations 
would be in the most direct position to make broad structural changes to the rules around insiders 
of the sport. Thus, changes to the training formalization should be detectable through the actions 
of these governing organizations.  
 
 
1) The 1982 edition was chosen as the first USFS Board of Directors report examined because it was   





Each year the USFS Board of Directors publishes a report on all of its approved actions. I 
examine the reports from the years 1982 to 2019.1 I take a tally of actions from each report that 
relate to athlete training difficulty and formalization as well as judge training (refer to Figure 4 
for the types of actions classified under each of these categories). I then plot these tallies per year 
to determine the number of these types of actions that were passed before and after the judging 
system changes. The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the judging system change 






Figure 3 ISU Organizational Structure; The USFSA was the official abbreviation of the United States Figure Skating 





In order to investigate hypothesis two (in regard to the sport’s attraction), I will make a 
similar delineation between micro and macro impacts. On the micro-scale, I will be drawing 
from first-hand published statements from skaters, coaches, and officials to determine their 
perspective on how the judging system change has impacted the performances of figure skating. 
I will make the same comparison between statements from 2004 to 2006 and statements made 
after 2010. These changes the skating insiders made are the direct causal link between the 
judging system shift and athlete behavior. I will also be collecting these insiders’ opinions on 
how these changes have affected the popular appeal of the sport. Of course, these statements 
would be mere conjecture; the opinions of internal stakeholders would not be able to definitively 
capture the effects on the behavior of external stakeholders like fans and prospective entrants to 
the sport. However, without a direct source covering the mindsets of these external stakeholders, 
these insider opinions provide an educated guess on the motivations behind spectators’ behavior. 
Ath. Training Difficulty Ath. Training Formalization Judge Training 
New test category Clarifying rules/element 
guidelines (e.g. definition of a 
spin) 
Training requirements for 
judges 
New test level Testing improvement task 
force 
New trainings 
Qualifying test requirements 
for competitions 
Coaching seminars Event review sessions 
Rules increasing standards of 
test (e.g. additional required 
element) 
Coach training sessions Judge level qualifications for 
competitions 
More difficult prerequisites to 
qualify for tests 
Structural changes to tests 
(e.g. new solo track) 




Technical Panel Committee 
creation 
Figure 4 USFS Combined Report of Action training mastery action classification  
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 In order to capture how external stakeholders have responded to the judging system 
change on a macro level, I draw from multiple different sources. There has been no systematic 
report released from US Figure Skating as to the ticket sales or attendance numbers of major 
skating events. Thus, to measure the popularity of the sport with the general public, I rely on 
information from several secondary sources. One view is the popularity of figure skating with 
the sports fans of the US. I evaluate this based on results from a Gallup poll conducted over the 
past four decades contextualizing the popularity of figure skating against other sports. 
Specifically, the poll measures the percent of Americans who consider each sport their favorite 
to follow. A second measure of popularity with the public is how often the sport is covered 
through print media. I use the number of mentions of figure skating in the New York Times as a 
proxy for popularity. The New York Times is considered a “newspaper of record” that historians 
rely on to provide an archival record of significant past events and associated public opinion at 
the time (Martin & Hansen 1998). As a measure of how prevalent figure skating was in the 
public consciousness in the eras pre and post the IJS, I plot a distribution of the percentage of 
articles centered on figure skating per year out of all Olympic sports related news.  
 A final measure of popularity especially important to the health of the sport is the 
robustness of its stream of new entrants who keep it growing and alive. As a metric of how 
attractive figure skating was to new entrants at different points in time, I compile membership 
numbers from past USFS reports. Membership status must be renewed with dues each year, so 
these numbers provide an indication of the number of people active in skating in the US. Further, 
the rate of growth in membership provides a measure of how effective the sport is at attracting 
new participants. 
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SECTION 1: TRAINING MASTERY 
 
Targeting Success 
 Practice has been long understood to be the “major independent variable in the 
acquisition of skill (Chase & Simon 1973). In order for an athlete to effectively institute 
deliberate practice, he would need a “full consciousness of the immediate object to aim at” 
(Martin 1953). In other words, a formal definition of the path to success is important for an 
athlete to understand what immediate goals he must strive to achieve. The process accountability 
mechanisms of the IJS provide athletes with a definitive checklist of the elements of a 
“successful performance”. In doing so, they lay the structure upon which athletes may climb 
toward success. The IJS has fundamentally changed both how skaters perform in competition 
and how they prepare in their day to day training.  
 For the skaters, a newfound form of motivation under the IJS is that they know that any 
effort they put toward fulfilling its guidelines will be rewarded. This gives skaters a strategic 
basis to draw upon when designing their programs. Understanding which elements will be 
rewarded by the judges allows skaters to build their performances tactically by their strengths. 
Michael Weiss, former US men’s champion, explains, “Do something good and you get points 
for it… Now you can control your own destiny” (2003). Weiss took advantage of the reward 
transparency of the IJS and adapted his programs by upgrading the difficulty of his spins, 
footwork, and transitions (2003). Likewise, US Olympian Johnny Weir, though a critic of the 
IJS, echoes Weiss’ sentiment that training under the system and “going for what will give you 
the most points” has made him a “stronger skater” (2006). From the beginning, the IJS has 
encouraged skaters to take on more challenging feats of athleticism. Weiss when asked if he 
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believes the new system would raise the standards of the sport comments, “I think it already has” 
(2003).  
 From its announcement, the IJS had the effect of encouraging athletes to push the 
boundaries of their athletic ability; this phenomenon has continued to hold true to the present 
day. Patrick Chan, three-time world champion, echoes the sentiments of his predecessors 
commenting, “The IJS rewards fairly every little bit of effort you put into the program” (2014). 
Furthermore, not only has the IJS impacted the program focus of individual athletes, longtime 
veterans of figure skating have observed a sustained impact on the standards of the sport. 
William Thompson, CEO of Skate Canada (Canada’s equivalent to the USFS), reflects 
“Programs the skaters are doing now are the type that officials under the old system were calling 
for: with complex footwork and difficult spins, as well as jumps” (2011). In fact, standards of 
athleticism in the sport have escalated at a dizzying rate. In the past decade figure skating has 
shifted to an unprecedented emphasis on increasingly difficult technical feats. The “Quad 
Revolution” in men’s and, more recently, women’s singles skating reflects skaters’ drive to 
attempt more and more difficult jumps (Tabb 2018). Skating insiders like Oleg Vasiliev, 
Olympic pairs’ champion and coach, credit this revolution to the new judging system that 
rewards individual elements in a way the 6.0 system did not (2019). By focusing on the quality 
of their individual elements, skaters are collectively pushing the athleticism of the sport forward. 
 Beyond the outwardly visible changes the IJS has wrought to skaters’ performances, it 
has also changed their fundamental approach to obtaining feedback in training. A US national 
judge explains that the IJS system provides skaters with much more “concrete knowledge” on 
how they need to improve (2006). A former skater and coach elaborates, “They tell you exactly 
what you need to do if you want to get a certain amount of points… it’s not like a guessing 
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game” (2006). Based off the directed feedback from judges in competition, skaters become 
cognizant of the individual elements that they must focus on in training. Another judge provides 
specific insight to the difference in skaters’ mindsets, “They’re much more aware of what they’re 
doing... they’re not so focused solely on what they landed or what they didn’t land… they’re 
going “Oh my God, did I hold my spirals long enough?...Did I get two revolutions in that edge” 
(2006). Skaters now have much more nuanced direction under the IJS and are systematically 
applying this feedback to their training.  
 For skaters, standard training practices have changed to give them even more 
opportunities for feedback; judges and officials have become increasingly involved in skaters’ 
day to day. After the implementation of the IJS, skaters incorporated “judge monitoring 
sessions” organized by the USFS into their practices. During these sessions, officials judge the 
skaters’ competitive programs and provide them with targeted feedback (Lom 2013). This level 
of judge involvement in skaters’ training had never happened under the 6.0 system. Adherence to 
the judging system has become so important that skaters have begun to seek out IJS-specific 
feedback outside of competition.  
 This trend of judge feedback in training has escalated in the present day. Now, judge 
input has become ubiquitous in skaters’ training. In a column to skating parents, the USFS 
advises parents to seek out feedback from judges for their children, explaining procedures for 
arranging critique sessions at local clubs and at competitions (Ogawa 2011). For judges too, 
these critique sessions have become a regular part of their duties. David Kirby, a US technical 
official, comments that working with skaters has become part of his normal routine; he has email 
video exchanges set up with coaches weekly (2015). Due to the availability of clear guidelines 
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for improvement delineated by the IJS, judge feedback has become a commonplace element of 
training at all levels of competition. 
Skaters have learned to interpret feedback from judges to meaningfully drive the 
direction of their training. For example, pairs skaters Caydee Denney and John Coughlin speak 
to hearing “the judges’ message loud and clear”. After judges had consistently marked their 
technical abilities near the top of the field but kept them from finishing near the top due to their 
low program component scores, they were driven to focus their training on the transitional 
components in between their elements and incorporating their “own fingerprints” into their 
performances (2012). Their approach to training is not unique but rather is indicative of how 
skaters have adjusted around the targeted feedback enabled by the IJS. This new training 
approach has provided skaters with the ample opportunities for “informative feedback … and 
repetition for the correction of errors” that form the foundation of deliberate practice toward 
performance improvement (Ericsson 1993). In this way, the IJS has augmented the skaters’ 
ability to achieve training mastery.  
 Not all change to the skaters’ training practices was immediate; notably changes at the 
coaching level took longer to manifest. Following the implementation of the IJS, some coaches 
did encourage skaters to put more emphasis on practicing technical elements that would be 
explicitly rewarded. However, a few international level skaters emphasize that the judging 
system change did not impact the overall way they trained. One skater explains that training 
practices vary heavily depending on the background of the coach. His coach is from Russia and 
has “an appreciation for the arts and for choreography” (2006). Therefore, his coach’s approach 
of emphasizing both technical excellence and the artistic coherence of his programs did not 
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change under the IJS. His story was true to many similar rinks where coaches continued to 
advise their skaters in much the same way they had prior to the IJS. 
It is understandable that coaches would be attached to their traditional ways of operating. 
At the elite level, skating coaching centers tend to be clustered around well-known figures who 
have been around the sport for a long time. The techniques at each rink are well-defined, and 
they are diverse in nature; each is known for its particular culture and “school of thought”. These 
coaches have been successful training their skaters in a certain way, so naturally, they would 
need time to adjust to a new playbook. Furthermore, it takes time under a new system for best 
practices to be uncovered and disseminated, so even the coaches more amenable to change 
would be expected to incorporate changes gradually. 
 This new information on best practices under the IJS eventually spread between US rinks. 
Though many training centers are institutions unto themselves, there still is a high degree of idea 
dissemination among coaches. Formal organizations like the Professional Skaters Association 
(PSA) exist to bring skating coaches and officials together and share knowledge. Following the 
shift to the IJS, these formal organizations rallied coaches around discussing how to best adapt to 
maximize their skaters’ point scoring potential. A report from a PSA conference in 2009 
documented the kind of advice being shared among attendants. David Kirby, technical specialist, 
urges coaches to “learn the rules… and start putting programs out there … to get your skaters out 
of the technical panel’s review process” (2009). Under the IJS, more attention is paid to the 
quality of a skater’s elements (e.g. jumps, spins, steps); elements under “technical review” are 
those of questionable quality under consideration for a point value downgrade. In essence, Kirby 
is urging coaches to train their skaters to execute elements with consideration for how officials 
under the IJS would evaluate them. Additionally, and more specifically, Charlie Cyr, another 
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ISU judge, advises that “maintaining good black and white skating positions is vital and 
achieving good skating skills as building blocks is everything” (2009). Through formal 
conferences and informal meetings between skating insiders, these practices on how to best 
prepare skaters for competing under the IJS have become more widely understood and adopted. 
 Gradually, operating under the IJS has become a new normal for coaches, and their 
practices have begun to align. Overall, coaches now rely much more on formally incorporating 
judge feedback into their skaters’ training regimens. Coach Tom Zakrajsek (elite national coach) 
describes his training philosophy, “When we (coach and skater) produce our work and a 
judgement is made in terms of scoring…, everyone on the skater’s team looks at what and how 
things have been decided and adjust their focus and emphasis accordingly” (2014). In essence, 
the focus of his entire coaching team is now centered around the scoring of a skater’s program. 
Coach Tom Z’s approach is not an isolated one. Terry Kubrick (national official) comments that 
being a good coach now involves much more homework on understanding how his skater’s 
program would fare under the IJS (2015). Though initially, coaches’ training approaches may not 
have varied substantially from under the 6.0 system, they have since evolved to contextualize 
quality skating firmly within the bounds defined by the IJS. As Coach Tom Z explains, “This is a 
natural occurrence since everyone who is competitive wants to advance” (2014). 
 All skating insiders were drastically impacted by the shift to the IJS process 
accountability system. Officials and skaters adapted immediately through tangible feedback 
sessions and newly narrowed training focus on areas for improvement defined under the IJS. 
Coaches took longer to adjust their modus operandi around the types of deliberate practice 
prescribed by the judging system. However, ultimately all of these insiders were able to derive 
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concrete knowledge from the IJS to adapt their approaches to helping skaters attain a greater 
degree of training mastery. 
Formalizing Best Practices 
 As we saw in the previous section, many of the adaptions of training practices were 
driven by initial efforts of governing institutions. For example, judge critiques began as formal 
sessions organized by the USFS (Lom 2013). Once these relationships between skaters and 
judges became common practice, skaters began to seek out judge feedback informally as well 
(Ogawa 2011). Similarly, coaches did not change their training philosophies to account for 
feedback from the IJS as soon as the judging system change was implemented (Lom 2013). 
Rather, coaches learned how to think about training methods in the context of the IJS from their 
peers and USFS officials at conferences organized by the PSA (Leamy 2009). The impetus for 
change in these instances came top-down as organizations created formal avenues to encourage 
skating insiders to realize the full value of information available under the IJS.  
 In addition, these formal organizations have instituted education structures to raise the 
standards for both judging and coaching. Since the IJS was implemented, the USFS has released 
a series of judging seminars and tests judges are required to pass before serving at official 
competitions. Technical officials likewise are required to attend a two-day seminar followed by 
an exam. Through these sessions, officials are put in the position of adjudicating an event and are 
evaluated on the accuracy of their calls. One official in training describes the process as 
“unexpectedly grueling” and “a little bit overwhelming” (2009). For coaches, the Coaches 
Educational Requirements (CER) were ratified in 2008 by the USFS. The CER was a joint 
project by the USFS and the PSA to formalize the education among US coaches consisting of 
online courses and tests. IJS rules make up one of the four core topics coaches are tested over. 
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Debbie Minter, a master-rated coach and test evaluator, explains “it will help to ensure the 
standard among all of the coaches” (Leamy 2008).  
 The onset of these education structures following the implementation of the IJS is to be 
expected considering a process accountability structure is associated with new categories and 
concepts that must be identified and accounted for. Defining these categories necessarily creates 
additional complexity for users as they learn the new system. As a result, the governing 
organizations have to step in to guide people on how to use them (Lom 2013). Thus, the era 
following the implementation of the IJS spurred organizations like the USFS and the PSA to 
create formal conferences, critique sessions, courses, and tests around understanding and 
working under the IJS.  
 The impact of the IJS of engendering more rigorous training standards was not simply 
carried out on the individual level; much of the change was driven by efforts of organizations 
like the USFS. Though it is evident that the implementation of the IJS motivated the creation of 
formal structures to facilitate the change, I was curious as to whether it had a deeper and more 
lasting effect on the operations of the governing organizations of figure skating. More 
specifically, a lasting effect might be a culture change toward a more sustained emphasis on 
formalizing training rules. To this end, I investigate the actions of the USFS (the main US figure 
skating governing body) over time. With this data, a tangible cultural shift could be demonstrated 
if the USFS passed more formalizing measures in the era following the implementation of the 
IJS, compared to the time period before.  
 The data I examine is from the USFS Board of Directors. Every year, the board releases a 
Compiled Report of Action, which documents every rule discussed by the board and whether it 
was approved or not. These rules come from proposals from a variety of committees covering 
 37 
everything from national budget allocations to inducting members into the Figure Skating Hall of 
Fame. I focused on rules relating to training for skaters and coaches because these would give 
me an impression of how relevant training mastery was to the organization in any given year. 
Many of these training rules govern the administration and interpretation of US Figure Skating 
tests. The USFS club resources page likens its test structure to the karate belt system. Skaters test 
though ascending levels until they reach “Double Gold Medalist” status – the equivalent of a 
black belt. Currently there are six to eight levels within each of the five different test tracks 
offered – Moves in the Field (compulsory figures), Free Skate, Pattern Dance, Free Dance, and 
Pairs. Testing levels are important for skaters because they represent levels of achievement in 
training mastery; they also provide qualification basis for skaters to enter different levels of 
official USFS competitions.  
I split the training related rules into the categories of training difficulty and training 
formalization. Training difficulty rules involve efforts directed toward raising the standards of 
the sport. This could be establishing new test categories and levels or rules that increase 
standards within a test (e.g. adding a new required element). On the other hand, training 
formalization has to do with educational initiatives or structural clarifications to the existing 
tests. Educational initiatives would be coach seminars and training sessions. Clarifications would 
be structural changes to the tests (e.g. establishing how requirements for different test tracks 
relate or clarifying guidelines over elements of existing tests). Once, I defined these categories, I 
documented and tallied the number of rules from each year’s Compiled Report of Action that fell 
into each of these two categories. Figure 5 depicts the trends in the number of training difficulty 




Figure 5 Number of training difficulty and training formalization rules approved by the USFS each year. 
  
 Overall, the trendlines for both training difficulty and training formalization appear to 
follow a sinusoidal pattern over ten-year cycles. It is to be expected that a formal organization 
may have built in timeframes after which they prescribe changes to their formalized structures. 
Much of the regular variation in the level of training rules may be attributed to such schedules. 
Without details from the representatives in the board meetings, it is difficult to associate these 
changes to distinct events as opposed to routine actions. I analyze the variance of this data to 
determine if the level of training rule changes in some years may deviate substantially from the 
norm.  
The trendline for training formalization does not seem to vary substantially from year to 
year. The standard deviation of the data points is approximately 2.2 rules. No rule total from any 
year markedly deviates from the average of 2.7 rules except for an isolated spike in 1995. If 
anything, there seems to be more of a difference in the number of formalization rules per year 
between before the early 1990s and after, rather than any substantial difference between pre and 







































































































































































Training Mastery Rules by the USFS over time
Training Difficulty Training Formalization
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An examination of rules implemented in the early 1990s reveals the impetus of many of 
the formalization rules may have been the elimination of the compulsory figures event from 
competitions in 1991. Though skaters were no longer scored on compulsory figures, many 
skating insiders still believed figures to be an integral part of skaters’ development. Figures 
embodied the discipline of skating, demanding strength, precision, and body control. In order to 
ensure skaters were still learning these skills, the USFS instituted the Moves in the Field test, 
which became the basic prerequisite to earning levels in any other test field (Miele 1999). The 
bulk of the formalization rules in this period centered around defining the Moves in the Field test 
and reweighting it in relation to the other tests in response to the changed competitive 
requirements.   
Following the 1995 spike in formalization rules, the distribution of new formalization 
rules approved per year remains fairly constant. The Board consistently reviewed and updated 
each of its tests year to year, iteratively clarifying element guidelines and structural relations 
between the tests. Training seminars for judges were implemented incrementally throughout this 
entire period as well. The only type of training formalization that varied consistently across the 
pre and post IJS eras was coaching training requirements because the first of these (CER) was 
implemented in response to the IJS (Lom 2013).  
Perhaps the discrepancy in the number of formalization rules approved through the 1980s 
and early 1990s and the consistently higher volume thereafter may indicate a cultural shift 
toward training formalization following major changes to the competition structure and the 
judging system. However, more research would need to be done into actions of the board prior to 
1982 (the first record in this data set) to ensure this volume discrepancy is not merely a natural 
fluctuation. As previously established, without direct input from insiders on the rationale behind 
2) A tally of approved rules by the Board of Directors that diminished the difficulty level of testing 
requirements remained consistently low. Thus, it can be reasonably claimed that elevated training 
difficulty standards would hold constant following their implementation. 
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each rule, it is impossible to determine the causal relationships between the rules recorded and 
the events that inspired them. Thus, it is difficult to parse out which (if any) of the events (the 
elimination of figures and the implementation of the IJS) inspired lasting or even temporary 
changes to the inclinations of the USFS to formalize its training structures. 
The variation in training difficulty rules seems to occur in more distinct peaks. There 
appear to be four clusters which vary substantially in volume of training difficulty rules (average 
rules approved = 4.5, standard deviation = 4.2). The spikes in 1985 and 2013 are more isolated 
(drastically more training difficulty rules in one year only). The 1985 spike was due to the 
establishment of an Adult series of dance tests, so the majority of the rules were a list of 
requirements for these new tests. Similarly, 2013 was a year the USFS majorly revamped the 
requirements to the pairs test.  
More interestingly, the other two peaks appear to be clustered around the previously 
identified periods of major change to competitive figure skating. In 1995 and 1996, deliberations 
of the board centered around responding to the elimination of compulsory figures by structuring 
the Moves in the Field test requirements and adjusting the prerequisites around all other tests 
accordingly. From 2005 to 2008, the board was responding to the implementation of the IJS in 
2004 and was adjusting test requirements to reflect the IJS guidelines for quality (e.g. spin 
positions must be held for at least three revolutions). These results seem to suggest that major 
changes to the sport are reflected in adjustments to training difficulty standards that are 
implemented and reevaluated over multiple competitive cycles. Though each of these spikes in 
volume of training difficulty rules waned after a few years, these escalations reflected elevated 
standards for training that would stay with the sport indefinitely.2 
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Ultimately the USFS Compiled Report of Action data was not able to conclusively reveal 
a relationship between the implementation of the IJS and an increase in training formalization 
rules. Though insider accounts have confirmed that formalized training structures have 
manifested in reaction to the IJS, there is inconclusive evidence to deem the post 2004 levels of 
training formalization a notable departure in volume from the formalization work done 
previously. However, the data did reveal that a multi-year period of elevated deliberation over 
new training difficulty rules did arise following the implementation of the IJS, demonstrating 
how organizational reactions to the IJS raised the training standards of the sport.  
 42 
SECTION 2: OCCUPATIONAL ATTRACTION 
 
Deemphasizing Artistry 
 Though a benefit of a process accountability system like the IJS is that it raises the 
standards of the sport, chasing the standard may encourage skaters to conform upon a single 
model for quality defined by evaluation criteria. Furthermore, breaking a performance down to 
specific evaluation criteria makes it difficult to reward the intangible, artistic qualities of skating 
performances. This may not be not be a desirable outcome in a sport where public interest in 
often “driven more by figure skating’s role as a showcase, … gracefully integrating strength and 
fragility, than by pure physical accomplishments” (Chloe Katz, pair skater 2014).  
 An inherent feature to a process accountability system is that it distills a performance into 
the sum of many small parts. Unlike the 6.0 system, under the IJS there is no concept of an 
“overall mark” that evaluates the effect of a skater’s entire performance. The IJS evaluates 
technical elements and artistic components separately and within each category has even more 
finely grained delineations. These tightly defined categories provide judges with specific criteria 
to evaluate; the tradeoff is that “then the full richness and wholeness of performances would not 
be assessed” (Rosengerg & Lockwood 2005). Ben Wright, Olympics referee and figure skating 
historian, corroborates, “If you have to mark every little element separately, you’ll never get 
your eyes off the paper… What it destroys is the concept of the overall performance” (2002).  
 This effect is especially problematic in an artistic field because artistic value is difficult to 
define. Without considering the entire product, many of the intangible qualities of a performance 
go unappreciated. Scott Williams, coach of Michelle Kwan, explains, “Occasionally something 
has a little bit of magic to it, and it surpasses the sum of its parts” (2003). The most iconic 
programs in history are the ones that capture people’s attention with the magic of their intangible 
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qualities. People tend to conform to standards set by an evaluation system, so a judging system 
that emphasizes individual components at the expense of these intangible qualities would 
disincentivize skaters from considering the overall artistic merit to their performances (Espeland 
& Sauder 2007). Furthermore, because technical elements are much easier than artistic 
components to define under a process accountability system, programs under the IJS would 
maximize technical merit at the expense of artistry.  
 One key area artistry has been stifled is in the cohesive construction of skaters’ programs. 
Olympian Johnny Weir comments, “You go for what will give you the most points, and most of 
the time, it’s very ugly. It’s not a pretty sport right now” (2006). Another elite skater confirms, 
“It’s less art, it’s more math, and it’s more cramming in points” (2006). In essence, skaters are 
choosing point-maximizing elements for their programs without regard for whether they are 
aesthetic. Furthermore, because skaters are fixated on filling their programs with point-grabbing 
elements, they do not have as much space in the program to create sustained stretches of 
beautiful movement. “Because the spins, steps, variations, and jumps take longer, you’re left 
with much less ability to create choreography as the program is created. You sort of have to lay 
the program out and add arms here, add arms there, put a little head turn there, put a kick there, 
and call that the choreography” (2006). Under the IJS point structure, skaters’ approach to 
choreography has become to pencil it in between technical elements, rather than telling a 
cohesive narrative throughout the program. Veteran choreographer Lori Nichol describes the 
process as “painting by numbers with a straight-jacket on” (2006).  
 In addition, the IJS disincentivizes skaters from trying innovative variations on elements 
because of how rigidly it defines the point generating potential of existing elements. Thus, 
deviating from norm has become risky. In other words, skaters could choose to perform a 
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creative, untested variation of an element, or they could pick from a laundry list of established 
positions that are guaranteed to get them maximum credit. Choosing from the established 
positions maximizes points whereas choosing to do something different could backfire. One 
Olympic level judge describes his frustration with the tired set of spin positions, “[take] an 
example of a difficult position like a … donut position… and there was nothing though to say to 
people [except] don’t repeat it over and over and over again, but because … coaches knew their 
skaters would get the level four difficulty for doing it, you had enough donuts out there for a 
bakeshop, and it was really boring to watch” (2006). Because innovation is not rewarded under 
the IJS, programs have become much more standardized. Lee Ann Miller, choreographer, states, 
“I hate the system… It’s left no creativity. Everything’s a cookie cutter” (2006).  
 The IJS has also diminished skaters’ ability to interpret their music in an emotional way. 
An Olympic skater and TV commentator speaks to the importance of musical interpretation in 
skating, “Skaters need a purpose for skating a program… that includes expressing music. Music 
needs to be the foundation. You have a canvas, and you have to make sure before you start 
painting, you have an idea” (2006). Traditionally, music had been the starting point for crafting a 
program. The music would inspire movement that would tell a story to the audience. Under the 
IJS, instead of building a program from a musical approach, the process is reversed. Skaters, 
coaches, and choreographers often start with a list of technical elements that will maximize a 
skater’s point generating prospects and then fit them as best as possible to a piece of music. 
Frank Carroll, elite coach, explains that this approach of laying out a program by “a 
mathematical game” prevents skaters from being inspired by what the music moves them to do 
(2006). Paul Wylie, Olympic silver medalist adds, “In a lot of cases the music is ignored [and] 
you miss that raw sort of emotion and interpretation” (2006). This lack of emotional connection 
 45 
has been felt keenly by those in the audience. Sonia Bianchetti Garbato, ISU official, comments 
of the 2006 Olympic Games, “I cannot remember another Olympic Games… in which the best 
skaters failed to leave me and the audience with a piece of their personality and the emotion of 
the moment” (2006). 
 Similar criticism that the IJS has stifled artistry in choreography, innovative elements, 
and musical expression has continued through the years long after the IJS became the new 
normal. Chloe Katz, former pairs skater, criticizes the IJS for incentivizing skaters to squeeze as 
many high value elements into their programs leaving “little time … for optional acrobatic or 
artistic showstoppers” (2014). Megan Marod, skater, comments, “All the programs end up 
looking exactly the same because everyone is trying to put in the same level four tricks” (2010). 
Phil Hersh, figure skating journalist, calls for a judging system change that would “allow the sort 
of expression that distinguishes one skater from another” (2014). The same problems with point-
grabbing, cookie cutter programs without emphasis on musical interpretation that skating 
insiders originally had with the IJS continue to surface along these same dimensions in the 
present day. 
 The shift in emphasis from artistry to technical prowess has been reflected in the stars of 
the new generation. Whereas the stars of the era pre-IJS like Katarina Witt and Michelle Kwan 
were renowned for their “passion for skating” and magical moments they created on the ice, top 
skaters under the IJS have been credited more for their point generating ability (Clarey 2003, 
Witt 2006). Rachael Flatt, 2010 US champion, is described as the IJS’s “perfect competitor” who 
is “mathematically astute in piling up points” (2010). Similarly, Adelina Sotnikova, 2014 
Olympic champion, is described as “tailor made for the current scoring system” (2014). Both 
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were commended for their tremendous technical ability but criticized for neglecting the artistic 
interpretation of their performances.  
There still are skaters of the post-IJS era who value building iconic programs from a musical 
vision. An elite skater names Evan Lysacek, Tessa Virtue and Scott Moir as examples of stars of 
the 2010 Olympics who simultaneously brought in points but also “brought out the human spirit” 
through compelling storytelling (2010). In addition, Nathan Chen, two-time world champion, 
speaks to working closely with his choreographer to capture the essence of his music in his 
skating (2017). However, as this type of program focus is not explicitly rewarded by the IJS, far 
fewer skaters and choreographers approach program construction in this way compared to what 
was common under the 6.0 system (Lom 2013).  
Depopularizing the Sport 
 The decline in artistry and creativity in figure skating is already, in many insiders’ eyes, 
an inherent loss. Moreover, if this perception has chilled external stakeholder interest in the 
sport, the impact could be to render figure skating financially untenable. Figure skating is already 
prohibitively expensive for many prospective athletes. Costs for skaters at the elite level can run 
anywhere from $35,000 to $50,000 annually in equipment, training, and competition fees 
(Mulhere 2018). Peter Carlisle, an Olympics sports agent, estimates that less than five percent of 
Olympic level skaters can earn enough in name recognition and competitive success to support 
themselves through prize money and sponsorships (2018). The rest of the field depend on grants 
and loans through national organizations like the USFS, supplemental pay from appearances in 
ice shows, and familial support to cover the rest. The vast majority of these sources of income 
are tied directly to the popularity of the sport. Prize money and grants from national skating 
organizations are drawn from accounts filled from ticket sales of skating competitions and 
 47 
membership dues. Ice shows depend on the avid skating fans willing to pay to attend. 
Sponsorships are dependent on the ability of athletes to draw their fanbase to a company’s 
product. If these sources of income were to dry up so too would participation in competitions at 
the highest levels.  
 Even from a non-financial perspective, the sport can only continue if it remains popular 
in the public consciousness because popularity attracts new skaters. The average age of an elite 
figure skater is 22 years (Lupkin 2014). Elite skaters are not able to spend many years near the 
top of the field, especially as the athletic standards for the sport continue to rise. Skating relies on 
a steady stream of new entrants who (or more likely their parents) are fans of the sport to become 
the champions of the next generation (Garcia 2018).  
 Recently, skating insiders have expressed concern for the health of the sport. Ashley 
Wagner, two-time US champion, referred to it as “a dinosaur”. “I am definitely worried for the 
sport from a business standpoint” (2014). Peter Carruthers, Olympic silver medalist, 
corroborates, “We have lost our audience. I see a slow death happening” (2014). By many 
measures these concerns appear valid. A major source of USFS revenue comes from TV 
licensing, and figure skating has become much less valuable to television broadcasters.  Until 
2007, ABC payed the USFS a $12 million annual rights fee. In 2012, the USFS reported the 
year’s broadcasting and licensing revenue to be $1.97 million (Hersh 2014). This is because TV 
viewership for skating events has declined. The 2014 Sochi Games netted 21.4 million viewers, 
less than half the number that tuned in for the games two decades prior (Garcia 2018). Perhaps 
some of this decline could be attributed to lower cable television viewership in general. 
However, attendance at live skating events has been in decline as well. US championships 
attendance have been far below capacity. Ice tours, a major source of income for athletes, have 
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suffered. The Champions on Ice Tour at its peak a couple of decades ago performed in 70 cities; 
it folded in 2007. The Stars on Ice tour, the premier international ice tour, had 65 shows in the 
US in 2001, 41 in 2010, and 26 in 2014 (Hersh 2014). Perhaps most concerningly, the pipeline 
for new skating stars seems to have dried up. The last mainstream stars in women’s skating, an 
event dominated by US women for over fifty years, were Michelle Kwan and Tara Lipinski who 
competed in the 1998 Olympics (Hersh 2014). Between 2006 and 2016, the US had an 
unprecedented nine-year drought of any US women on the podium at the world championships 
or the Olympics (Brennan 2016).  
Philip Hersh, figure skating journalist, interviewed a dozen current and former 
competitors for their intuition on the reasons behind the sport’s decline. These insiders cite the 
waning of the professional ice-skating circuit, the lack of US stars in the sport, and the 
incomprehensible judging system causing skaters to “sacrifice creativity for math” (2014). Sally 
Stapleford, former skater and official, comments, “What made skating so wonderful to watch and 
enjoy is now dying in front of our very eyes” (2004).  
In order to gain a more comprehensive picture of skating’s decline in popularity, I 
examine data on the variation of both fan opinion and content producer engagement with figure 
skating over time. Though this analysis cannot provide proof to the causality behind figure 
skating’s decline in popularity, it can situate this decline chronologically. From this information, 
it is possible to determine whether the pattern matches our expectations – that the decline in 
popularity occurred following the implementation of the IJS in 2004.  
In order to visualize how the fan following of skating has varied over time, I draw from 
Gallup poll data. Starting from 1937, Gallup asked respondents to select “What is your favorite 
sport to follow?” out of 19 different sports in order to ascertain the relative popularity of each. 
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The wording of the question is agnostic to the medium respondents use to follow their sport of 
choice. The responses are visualized in Figure 6 below. 
 
 
Figure 6 Gallup poll results: Percentage of respondents whose favorite sport is figure skating per year. 
 Though the data collection for the poll is sporadic, it paints a picture of a rise in figure 
skating popularity beginning around the 1970s or 80s. The peak years for the figure skating fan 
base are also difficult to determine given the sparseness of data points through the 80s and 90s. 
However, under the assumption that the years of peak popularity were around years of the 
Olympics Games, the period of the most sustained public interest was around the Olympic 
Games in 2002. From that time onwards, there seems to have been a steep decline in figure 
skating popularity over the following decade. This pattern seems to affirm the hypothesis that 
figure skating popularity declined in response to the effects of the implementation of the IJS in 
2004.  
 Another view of how prevalent figure skating is in the public consciousness is through 
how the sport is covered by the media. I used random samples of archival records from the New 
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from the Gallup poll in that the poll captures the proportion of strong skating fans per year; for 
these fans, skating was their number one sport of choice. The New York Times provides a 
measure of more general public interest, not just that of the super fan. In order to measure figure 
skating popularity in a given year, I calculated the percentage of articles covering figure skating 
out of all the articles over Olympic sports. Given the naturally periodical nature of Olympic 
articles, I evaluated popularity in terms of Olympic cycles. The distribution of skating related 
articles is depicted below in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 Percentage of Olympic articles covering figure skating per year. 
 This view of general public interest provides a different historical narrative compared to 
that of the Gallup poll. The standard deviation of the data is around 4.8 percentage points from 
the average of 3.8 percent. The three Olympic cycles that are outside of a single standard 
deviation of the average are the peaks around the 1994, 2002, and 2018 Olympic cycles. The 
visualization seems to indicate that the greatest peak popularity of the sport was around the 1994 
Olympic cycle and the second highest peak around the 2002 Olympics. From there, there appears 
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to be a down-turn in popularity for the subsequent three Olympic cycles with an uptick in the 
year 2018.  
 The skew of the figure skating article mentions in 1994 and 2002 make sense given the 
sensationalist nature of the media. 1994 was the year of the Tonya Harding and Nancy Kerrigan 
incident, and 2002 was the year of the Olympic Pairs event judging scandal. Indeed, the articles 
from these two years are dominated by coverage of these two events. These events would have 
helped figure skating capture the interest of the general public. In fact, many skating insiders 
believe that “scandals are just a part of the intrigue that fuels the sport of figure skating” (Roberts 
2002). These insiders appreciate the publicity and attention scandal brings to the sport.  
 The period of the greatest peak in coverage of Olympic figure skating took place around 
the 1994 Olympics. Though most of this coverage was centered around the Tonya Harding and 
Nancy Kerrigan incident, another contributing factor to the buzz at the time was likely due to the 
Winter Olympics event in 1994 following just two years after the event in 1992. 1994 was the 
first year the Winter Olympics fell on a different cycle from the Summer Olympics; prior they 
had occurred in the same year. Many skating fans only follow Olympic events, so excitement 
from the previous Olympic cycle was still fresh in the minds of spectators as they tuned in for the 
1994 event. This elevated interest around Winter Olympics at the time would naturally be 
reflected in greater coverage of figure skating, the most popular winter sport. 
 Overall, the New York Times data seems to fit the narrative that the sport has been in 
decline since the 2004 shift in judging systems. However, the uptick in figure skating news 
reports in the 2018 Olympic cycle could be a signal of hope for the sport. The media coverage in 
this year was not dominated by any one scandal. Rather, articles centered on the incredible 
athletic feats carried off by Americans at the games, specifically the triple axel landed by Mirai 
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Nagasu (the first American lady to land the jump in international competition) and the six (world 
record breaking number) of quadruple jumps executed by Nathan Chen in his Olympics free 
skate. This effusive coverage may be a signal that the prospects of the sport might be rising with 
the technical prowess of America’s next set of skating stars. Perhaps figure skating could gain its 
second wind in popularity as the public adjusts to its appeal as a display of extraordinary athletic 
ability even if its artistic appeal is not what it once was.   
 Figure skating’s popularity with the general public is important because the sport needs 
to attract new entrants to produce the next generation’s skating stars who will in turn keep 
interest in the sport alive (Garcia 2018). As an additional measure of sport popularity, I look at 
USFS membership numbers as an indication of the number of people involved with the sport. 
The USFS requires members to renew their dues each year, so the membership count serves as 
an accurate depiction of the number of people involved with the sport in the US. Presumably, the 
changes in membership numbers year to year would give an indication to how well the sport 
manages to retain and gain new members to replace the those leaving the sport. Figure 8 is a 
visualization of USFS membership year to year; Figure 9 is a visualization charting the 
percentage change in membership between each year. 
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Figure 8 USFS membership numbers per year. 
 
Figure 9 Percentage change in USFS membership numbers between years. 
 
 Membership grew fairly consistently through the 1990s and early 2000s, peaking in 2005. 
Thereafter, the membership levels remained stable, hovering around zero percent change from 
2006 until 2019. Though the end of the membership growth period following 2005 seems to 
indicate a decline in popularity, there does not appear to be any immediate danger to the pipeline 
of talent in the sport. David Raith, executive director of the USFS expresses optimism, pointing 
to these steady membership numbers (2014). This steady trend could be attributable to USFS 
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USFS has instituted new youth programs, such as Learn to Skate, a nationwide program of 
skating classes, and Icemen, a group for two-year-old boys. These programs seem to have been 
successful at stimulating interest in figure skating at the lower levels. Though given the widening 
gap in performance at the elite level between the US and other skating powerhouse countries like 
Russia and Japan, if new participant numbers is not the issue, the USFS must develop new 
strategies to help refine the talent that they already have to be competitive with the rest of the 
world (Dunaway 2018). 
 Examining historical trends in figure skating popularity with strong fans, the general 
public, and prospective members indicates that public interest did in fact decline following the 
implementation of the IJS in 2004. Thus, it appears that skating insiders’ fears several decades 
ago of the IJS stripping away the watchability of the sport has come to pass. Fortunately, the ISU 
has not been deaf to insiders’ concerns around the decline of artistry and is in the process of 
restructuring competitions to rebalance the contents of skaters’ programs. At the latest ISU 
council meeting, officials discussed a proposal to divide competitions into two separate 
showcases, one a technical event and the other an artistic one (Hersh 2020). Details have yet to 
be released on how each of these events is to be judged, and time will only tell how effective this 
new structure may be to recapture the magic that has been escaping the sport in recent history. 
However, this announcement demonstrates that stakeholders are committed to seeking the 







 Accountability structures have a tendency to affect “how we think beyond simply what 
we think”, which can deeply impact the behavior of people within an organization (Frink et al. 
2008). This thesis has reconciled the understanding of how process versus outcome 
accountability structures can benefit or detriment an organization depending on the position of 
the affected stakeholder.  
 Internal stakeholders benefit from the “concrete knowledge” provided to them by a 
rigid process accountability system. This knowledge is integral to insiders’ understanding of how 
to succeed within the bounds of the system, boosting them toward attaining training mastery. On 
a macro-level, organizations reflect this wealth of available knowledge by formalizing members’ 
training to enhance their ability to succeed. Under this system, insiders improve quickly toward 
attaining the process accountability system’s tightly defined definition of success.   
 External stakeholders, however, may be put off by the conformity of products by 
members under the process accountability system. Many desirable qualities, such as creativity, 
may be intangible and difficult to capture categorically under a process accountability system. 
Thus, the rigidly defined picture of success insiders move toward may not be one external 
stakeholders are willing to engage with. This is problematic in fields dependent on external 
interest to survive, whether this is via financial support or supplying prospective new entrants. 
External stakeholder interest then may be better served by an outcome accountability structure 
that allow insiders greater flexibility in creating quality output. 
 Ultimately, the onus is on an organization to determine the relative importance of the 
growth of internal stakeholders against the interest of external stakeholders. This paper provides 
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organizational leaders with a framework with which to consider the system that would best suit 
their organization’s values and purposes. 
Theoretical Contributions 
The first theoretical contribution of my research is to provide a framework to reconcile 
conflicting effects of accountability structures uncovered through existing research. Experiments 
evaluating the performances of projects under process and outcome accountability systems have 
not conclusively provided evidence of the performance effects of either. Results were mixed with 
an array of studies finding significant positive impact under process accountability and 
insignificant results under outcome accountability (Henderson & Lee 1992; Klein et al. 2006) 
and vice versa, positive impact under outcome accountability and insignificant results under 
process accountability (Tiwana & Keil 2010, Gopal & Gosain 2010). My research provides the 
mediating factor of the origin of the stakeholder (internal or external) as a contributing variable 
to the efficacy of process versus outcome accountability systems.  
Second, my research is conducted in a naturalistic setting more parallel to the work 
conditions of an organization considering the implementation of either a process or outcome 
accountability system than the laboratory experiments covered in the majority of available 
literature. A laboratory setting could skew results in ways artificial to a real-world scenario. For 
example, in laboratory experiments, process accountability is often simulated by simply asking 
participants to justify the decisions they made. The act of asking for justification could signal to 
participants that the scenario presented is normatively ambiguous, encouraging them to process 
provided information more vigilantly to come to a defensible solution (Patil, Tetlock, Mellers 
2016). In contrast, organizations usually rely on process accountability to signal the opposite -- 
that there is a prescribed procedure for making decisions (Davis & Kottemann 1994). 
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Conversely, these experiments may have conflated outcome accountability scenarios with 
normative definitiveness through the messaging that participants’ results would be compared 
with more credible sources to assess their accuracy (Patil, Tetlock, Mellers 2016). These “hit or 
miss” test scenarios may be associated with greater pressure than those of the normatively 
ambiguous process accountability test scenarios (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates 1996). My research, 
conducted in a naturalistic setting, is free from the possibility of undesired signaling from 
artificially created accountability scenarios and can thus, provide an unbiased perspective into 
the effects of both systems.  
Third, my research is a longitudinal study that reveals the impact of process and outcome 
accountability systems over time. This addresses the limitation of prior research in accountability 
that has been largely confined to “single-session laboratory experiments in which subjects had 
little or no opportunity for learning and adjustment” (Chang et al. 2017). My study of figure 
skating over many decades provides ample opportunity to observe the sustained impact of both 
process and outcome accountability structures after they are accepted by all stakeholders 
involved as the norm. Similarly, within the field of sports history, work has been done to 
document the impressions of figure skating insiders on the IJS immediately following the 
judging system change. My work builds upon this previous research to contribute to the 
understanding of whether these impacts are observable over a sustained period of time. My study 
of observable effects on figure skating training mastery and external interest reflects how figure 
skaters have adjusted their performance to the new process accountability system from the time 
of its inception to after they have adjusted to it as their status quo.  
Finally, my research provides a practical framework that organizational leaders may use 
to determine the proper accountability system to serve their organizational goals, especially in 
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fields that value creativity as an important dimension of success. Decision makers should 
evaluate to what degree their overall performance depends on the perspective of internal or 
external stakeholders to inform the accountability structure they ultimately choose. If companies 
are most concerned with ensuring employees understand how their actions directly contribute to 
their performance, decision makers should employ a process accountability system. On the other 
hand, if decision makers are concerned with how external stakeholders judge their output, they 
should employ an outcome accountability system. As in the case of figure skating, if 
organizational leaders have to wrestle with both the interests of internal and external 
stakeholders, my research should inform leaders of the potential benefits and raise awareness of 
the need to account for any drawbacks of each system and open discussion over designing a 
system that would blend the two effects.  
Limitations & Areas of Further Research 
 I chose to use a historical research methodology because this lens allowed me to draw 
conclusions over the long-term impact of accountability systems. Comparing pre-recorded 
accounts and data from the time periods I was investigating (immediately following the judging 
system shift from 2004 to 2006 and the era following the normalization of the system from 2010 
to the present day) allowed me to avoid the recency bias that interviewing stakeholders, asking 
them to reflect over the full time period, would suffer from. However, a limitation of this 
approach was that it was not possible to explicitly draw causality from the judging system shift 
to the behavior changes observed. My historical study could be supplemented with interviews 
with skating stakeholders to determine if their perceptions of how their behavior has changed due 
to the judging system shift corroborates my findings. Another limitation of a long-term case 
study is that an organization undergoes many changes in any given period of time, so it is 
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difficult to isolate the effect of an accountability system shift. To refine our understanding of 
how the position of a stakeholder may mediate his response to an accountability system, this 
relationship would have to be examined in a controlled experimental setting.  
Another limitation of my research was that case study I used was only an investigation of 
the impacts of different accountability systems within a single cultural context. All of the data on 
effects documented on training and occupational attraction were from the US Figure Skating 
Association or from entities within the United States. Previous research from Patil & Tetlock 
highlights how cultural context may mediate the effects of process and outcome accountability 
(2014). For example, conformity to a process accountability structure may be intensified in a 
collectivist system. Alternatively, creative pursuits may be more emergent through outcome 
accountability structures in individualist systems. International figure skating provides a unique 
context in which a universal accountability structure is dictated top down to national governing 
bodies, each with their own cultural contexts. Perhaps individualist national cultures (e.g. the 
United States) may have been more encouraged by an outcome accountability system to deviate 
from the norm and create more innovative programs compared to collectivist national cultures 
(e.g. Japan). In addition, the observed effect of conformity to the IJS may have been intensified 
in a collectivist national culture. A comparative analysis could shed light to the degree cultural 
context mediates an organization’s response to different accountability types. 
 An additional limitation is that my research solely contextualizes process and outcome 
accountability systems along the differentiating dimension of formality (the IJS was a formally 
codified institutional mechanism compared to the 6.0 system which was much less formal and 
allowed for unwritten, less objective rulings). Cardinal et al. has identified two other dimensions 
of control my research does not account for (2017).  
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The first of these is coerciveness, depending on how the accountability system is 
perceived by the people evaluated – whether it is viewed as an enabling and helpful to employees 
reach their goals or if it is a “heavy hand” for compliance. Figure skating provides a context in 
which skaters are highly enabled by the judging system; they are motivated to conform because 
success defined by the judging system is perfectly in line with their personal definitions of 
success. My research was able to determine the impact of process and accountability systems in 
this maximally enabled context where participants are highly motivated to understand how to 
best succeed under the system. Thus, my findings on the benefits and drawbacks to each system 
may not hold true in a more coercive culture where individuals are likely to take care of their 
own interests ahead of the organization’s and the accountability structure is meant to keep them 
in line with rules and directives. This context likely will not be found in a similarly competitive 
environment, but there may be plenty of scope for researchers to study less voluntary contexts 
(e.g. education).  
The second dimension of control is how singular or holistic the accountability system 
may be. My research took a singular understanding of a process versus an outcome 
accountability structure, looking at two singular examples that matched each type. However, the 
understanding of accountability systems has evolved to include a more holistic approach that 
involves a blended system with characteristics of both process and outcome accountability. This 
holistic type of system is likely what would best suit a complex organizational context like figure 
skating that must balance interests of both internal and external stakeholders. As the field of 
international figure skating continues to evolve with the aim of seeking a balance between 
driving training mastery and fueling creativity and popular appeal, it may yet become a fertile 
environment through which to study a balanced process and outcome evaluative system.  
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